Brazil is in crisis. This crisis, and agreeing upon a unified course of action in response, was the topic of a plenary of broad left forces that included over 320 people coming from over 60 leftist formations last Friday evening.

João Pedro Stedile, the renown progressive economist and a founder of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, characterized the current period as a three-pronged crisis never seen in Brazil since redemocratization: economic crisis, political crisis, and social crisis.

Economic Crisis

The declining economy has been the immediate major source of tension in recent years. Following a decade-long economic boom, Brazil’s economy has been shrinking since 2012, unemployment reached 6.9% in June on this year, the highest since July 2010, while inflation reached 9.56% in July, the highest since November 2003. The bleak economic situation has caused a wave of rich Brazilians to leave the country in favor of relocating their homes and businesses in the United States, and there has been a chilling effect on middle class consumption. As always, though, the most grave effect has been on the basic sectors. Workers from various industries – from school teachers to civil servants to bank employees – have conducted protracted strikes, budgets for public services that low-income earners rely on, like education and health, have been frozen, workers’ benefits are stricter, and the price of public transportation has increased. As in most economic recessions, while the capitalists claim that they are losing vast amounts of money, it is the families that were once barely making it that have slipped back into poverty, and the poor who have found their much relied-on public services diminishing.

Political Crisis

This economic crisis is a, if not the, major driver of the unfolding political crisis. Many analysts agree that President Dilma Rousseauf’s first electoral victory could largely be credited to her robust endorsement by the still widely popular outgoing president, Luis “Lula” Da Silva, and a strong ruling party in the PT. Dilma, however, has had the extreme misfortune of 1: governing at a time of recession, as opposed to Lula who was elected at the end of a steep economic decline and governed during an economic boom, and 2: lacking the personal charisma and political skill that Lula so famously possessed. (It is worth noting that, as in most proportional representation systems, the PT has never controlled a majority of seats in the Congress. It has always ruled in coalition and these coalitions have always included progressive to centrist and traditional elements. Lula’s ability to manage the coalition – some would say through too much compromise – was a key factor that contributed to his governments’ stabilities. Dilma is less charismatic and less skilled at coalition management.) Add to this mix some hardy corruption scandals (though in my opinion, nothing more outrageous than scandals from past administrations), and you have a government very much more vulnerable to opposition and especially attacks from the right.

This vulnerability was acutely illustrated during the 2014 elections. The election began as a three-way race between Dilma, Acéio Neves Cunha, a traditional politician from the center-right Partido Socialista do Brasil (PSDB), and Eduardo Campos of the Partido Socialista Brasileria (PSB).

While it was expected that the PT’s main challenge would come from the PSDB, Brazil’s second largest party, Campos of the PSB was an interesting development. Since the PT was founded, and particularly since it assumed the presidency in 2002, various small tendencies from within the party have split. Some groups split for personal reasons and some for ideological reasons. Several of the groups that split, like the Partido da Causa Operária (PCO), Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (PSTU), and Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL), had fielded their own presidential candidates in past elections but received nearly negligible vote percentages. In the 2010 presidential elections, these parties received a combined vote of about 1%.

In 2014, however, the PSB, which was never part of the PT but was part of its electoral coalition in 2010, split from the coalition and fielded its own candidate in Eduardo Campos. Formerly a Science and Technology Minister under Lula, Campos portrayed himself as a leftist who was simultaneously business-friendly – he campaigned for increased spending on education, health and universal public services (including the Bolsa Familia) while reducing the size of government, reducing government intervention in Brazil’s various semi-state-owned companies (a version of GOCCs), reducing red tape for business and aggressively investing in alternative energy. His running mate, Marina Silva, was a well-known environmental advocate who had an impressive run under the Green Party in the 2010 presidential elections, coming in third place with 19% of the vote (in the first round). Silva had also previously been a cabinet minister (of environment) during a Lula government and she remained a PT member until 2009.

Not insignificantly, much of Campos’ campaign messaging focused on a “third way,” or attempting to convince voters that they had an option that was not the PT or the PSDB. Every Brazilian presidential election since 1994 has essentially been a contest between the PT and the PSDB, with these parties gaining over 80% of first round votes. Additionally, much of Brazilian political life has been painted, especially by the Globo media monopoly, as a polarizing dichotomy between the PT and the PSDB. There are two meaningful insights to note about Campos’s campaign: First, his strategy involved painting the PT as the “establishment”, and no longer as a party of economic and social transformation. Second, his candidacy provided a focus for those who still considered themselves left – or at least those that supported the PT’s social welfare programs – but were frustrated with Dilma’s performance.

Campos tragically died in a plane crash less than two months before the elections and Marina Silva took on the mantle of being the PSB’s presidential candidate. Silva was doing well, consistently outpolling Cunha and even tying Dilma around five weeks before the elections. At the end, however, her ranked position and the overall hype surrounding her campaign (along, of course, with a plethora of other factors) made her the logical main target of both the PT and the PSDB’s offensives. Silva ended up coming in third falling only two points behind Cunha with 22% to Cunha’s 24%. Accordingly, she was not included in the 2nd round.

In the 2nd round of the elections, where Dilma faced Cunha head-on was the tightest presidential race in recent history. Despite rampant and outspoken criticisms of Dilma’s government, the left unified and mobilized to support Dilma, with the position that a Dilma/PT-led government, for all its faults, would be better than a rightist Cunha-led government. Dilma’s campaign, in turn, moved to the left, including promising to use Petrobras revenues to dramatically augment health and education budgets, in response to and acknowledgement of who the party’s core constituency was and who would deliver the PT to victory.

Following the election, Dilma’s policies nearly immediately moved back towards the right. Despite this, rightist political forces have maintained their attacks. Rightist groups have organized three national protests so far this year, including a national day of action on August 16 that gathered almost 200,000 people in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasilia, and other cities to call for Dilma and the PT’s ouster. Dilma has weathered a seemingly constant threat of impeachment. These are expected to continue until the end of her term.

 

Social Crisis

The economic crisis has also bred a general tension and discomfort that is palpable in daily life. Economic and political insecurity are common topics of conversation even in social functions with non-political people. Economic tension tends to accentuate other social tensions such as racial, class, and regional divisions, and rightist attacks on the PT’s social welfare programs often also come with characterizations of traditionally marginalized populations (especially people from the north, poor people, Blacks, and immigrants) as lazy, ill-intentioned and parasitic.

Social movements, for their part, are far from their apex. The height of social movement activity was in the latter part of the military dictatorship until the 1990s. Despite a reinvigoration of large public manifestations in recent years, which arguably peaked in 2013, social movements are having difficulty inspiring and recruiting this new population of outraged citizens into an organized force. As Stedile characterized in Friday’s event:

“Most working people come home and watch the political crisis from their sofas like they watch a tennis match. Dilma says something and then Cunha [the right-wing lower house speaker who Dilma narrowly defeated for the presidency in 2014] says something and then the PT responds…”

When the audience laughed at this characterization, Stedile quickly retorted, “I don’t know why you are laughing. This is our problem. The people are watching politics like a game instead of going to the streets.” Like the Philippines, NGOs are also in crisis as donors are pulling out of Brazil in favor of less “democratically developed” countries.

The Plenary

The Plenary meeting had three stated objectives. The first was to forge unity (the perennial left problem). Second was to approve a joint manifesto to oppose any impeachment attempts, which they referred to as coups, and oppose the government’s fiscal adjustment policies, which include cutting social investments and increasing taxes on basic services such as electricity and water. Third was to agree to mobilize their bases for a large manifestation on August 20 wherein these demands will be voiced.

While the left forces in attendance were overwhelmingly unsatisfied and angry with the current government, their stand is to prevent Dilma’s ouster. This stand is based on the analysis that an ouster would result in a Cunha-led government, which would be infinitely worse than Dilma’s government. The second, and I think more important stand, is to show Dilma and the PT that the left is the only force saving them from a right-wing coup. Essentially, the intention is to consolidate and raise to public consciousness a political force that carries the message: “We are the ones who got you elected, we are the ones protecting you from a coup, you must move your policies to the left because if we leave you will be left with nothing.”

Points to Ponder

 

Watching these events unfold has made me ponder some issues I think are relative to our own struggle:

What happens when party supporters are not happy with the party’s performance in government?

Many of us have been observers of the PT for many years, seeking to extrapolate lessons that could inform a leftist, social movements-based party rise to power in the Philippines. We have witnessed changes within the PT, and heard many of our long-time and respected friends and comrades from Brazil criticize the PT for various versions of “going neoliberal”, “acquiescing too much to elites and the Washington Consensus”, and even “becoming the new elite.” Since Akbayan entered into coalition with the LP, it has faced many of the same important questions, from both within and without. “Will Akbayan be tainted by elites?” “Will Akbayan compromise its values as a leftist party?” and even “Will Akbayan be corrupted by its proximity to power?” and “What will be the role of social movements in and with Akbayan?” There are also similarities with how internal dynamics within the two parties have developed. There are, broadly speaking, those who want to split and create a new party, those who struggle from the inside to pull the PT to the left, and those more willing to compromise with traditional politics. The struggle to answer these questions is an ongoing process that will continue to determine Akbayan’s nature as a party. After 12 years as the ruling party, the PT and allied social movements are still struggling with the question, which are a reflection of the different tendencies and internal democracy that comprise the PT. I consider this tolerance for different left tendencies and internal debate, and especially the presence of those who actively criticize the party within left circles but defend it outwardly because of their investment in the PT project, to be the main source of the party’s strength.

Parallel, yet independent force

In this (like the Philippines) highly personalistic political culture, there is a tendency among the many disappointed leftists to attribute the policies that have unfolded over the past few years, at least in part, to Dilma’s personal characteristics: “Dilma no longer cares for the working class.” “Dilma has forgotten her ideals as an activist.” I do not know Dilma Rousseauf. These accusations may very well be true. However, I choose to take a more structural viewpoint. Dilma heads a minority government. The right is strong and the left is weak. The right, naturally, is using its position of strength to negotiate for rightist policies, and they are getting them. Even if Dilma was personally the most radical leftist conceivable, she would have to compromise in order to hold onto the presidency and prevent someone from the extreme right from taking over. Thus, I tend to think the adoption of rightist policies reflects the weakness of the left more than they reflect Dilma’s political will (or lack thereof).

Ideally, social movements allied with the PT intended to pursue a strategy of organizing independently from the PT in order to maintain pressure the party and other political forces at large. At times, however, this has proven difficult in practice. Many observers have criticized PT-aligned social movements, and the MST in particular, for being less militant and vocally critical of the government since the PT came into power. (It is worth noting that evidence suggests that the Lula government settled more families than the preceding Cardoso administration, though, some agrarian reform advocates have argued that his administration merely regularized/formalized existing occupations.) Observers I have spoken to characterized left social movements as being in a somewhat sluggish phase since the PT took power. Movements slowed down organizing, recruitment, education, and research, relying on the PT instead to simply deliver demands. While PT governments delivered significant victories on social welfare and economic development fronts, they have certainly not approximated achieving the socialist revolution or fundamental change of the established predatory social and economic system.

Nevertheless, the call on Friday was clear. The left is no longer to rely on just having a supposed ally in the presidential office, nor is it to call for blanket support or ouster. It must grow and consolidate its own independent force of militants while drawing unorganized public opinion to its side in order to negotiate specific policy concessions with the government.

To quote an interview Stedile gave in 2007:

“Deep down the government is like a mirror that reflects society. And if in society the working class is weak, if it’s in reflux, a leftist government can’t advance its agenda…

“I’m not absolving him of his responsibility, but Lula’s administration hasn’t been able to make changes because of the reflux in the proletariat that hasn’t yet reversed. We didn’t count on this. We thought that a simple electoral victory would give a shock to the masses…We thought this was it, the time had come! And it hadn’t. It was really frustrating…This is the greatest challenge that we face today: we’re waiting around, seeing if the government will do this or that instead of just acting on our own. And of course it’s better that Lula will be reelected than to have Alckmin [of the PSDB] win. Obviously we’ll vote for Lula, but real change will only come with the process of organization among the people and the rising of the proletariat. That is the only chance we have.”

It’s not about the individual, it’s about the system / Elections are but one of many fronts

This isn’t the first time we’ve heard “we need to go back to organizing the base.” Nearly every meeting on left strategy that I have attended in the past near-decade has inevitably come down to this point. However, watching the unfolding events in Brazil makes the need to organize, maintain, and grow a base that much more evident.

The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Akbayan are political parties and one of the purposes of a political party is to gain elected office. However, gaining office is not akin to winning the revolution. Revolution is about a fundamental change in society and economy, and the electoral front is but one means of accessing power that would later enable this fundamental change.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that although both Brazil and the Philippines are strong presidentialist systems, the president is not as powerful as we often think. The vast majority of politicians come from established landed or capitalist interests and so have their own personal power bases independent of party politics, especially national politics. As a result, national figures depend on the local elites for vote delivery and often even program administration. Furthermore, our fight is no longer contained to the proletariat versus the domestic elite. As a comrade from the MST reminded me, the left in the developing world must also deal with the pressure predatory transnational capital places on government and the alliances they forge with domestic capital.

We would be foolish to think that “getting a good president elected” would be enough to effectively fight off capitalism. Even if, by some particularly plucky electoral strategy, we were able to elect “true leftists” (whatever that means) to the highest positions, this would still be insufficient to take on traditional elites, the various industrial syndicates, and transnational capital without a strong popular backing.

Any government the left would participate in, even lead, in our systems within the foreseeable future would necessarily include elements from the center and right in order to maintain some kind of stability. In the face of immeasurable money and institutions biased towards the status quo, the organized masses are the political power necessary to both support the progressives in government, especially when they take the radical steps we so desire, as well as to shame and isolate the reactionaries.

Thus, the fronts we must engage in are as numerous as there are sources of power. Legal-electoral, yes, but also educational, identity-cultural (including pop culture), media, developmental, resource accumulation, and of course, membership and militancy. We are not merely fighting against reactionary politicians. We are fighting against a political-economic-social system. An empowered society with socialist values that is ready to take various forms of action when necessary is the only assurance of victory.

This is not to say that we should give up pursuing electoral and even governmental coalitions with non-progressive forces for fear of getting our hands dirty. Something the left is an expert at, much more expert than the right, is splitting our forces and trading judgmental accusations about who “more left” and is a “true, pure socialist.” For a group that claims to value diversity and open thought we sure do seem to have dogmatic tendencies. Many of the groups who attended last Friday’s plenary were groups that attacked the PT for this exact reason. They even included parties and organizations that count themselves among the left-wing opposition to the PT. Yet, they saw the need to support, while engaging the government at this conjuncture, even if it hurt their ideological sensibilities.

The struggle that we engage in is not merely about being correct. We are not conducting an academic exercise where being correct is enough to feel proud of ourselves and say we did our job. The stakes are simply too high to treat it as such. The struggle we engage in, no, that we live, is about gaining real political power in a system where compromise is inevitable. It is about being honest about our own strengths and especially our weaknesses, taking responsibility for such, and realizing that sometimes choosing the lesser evil is the best we can do today, while we lay the conditions for tomorrow.

Resources:

http://en.mercopress.com/2015/05/22/brazil-heading-for-full-recession-economic-activity-down-unemployment-up

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-04/pro-market-campos-offers-brazil-3rd-way-in-bid-to-oust-rousseff

http://www.mstbrazil.org/news/lula-meaning-agrarian-reform

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/inflation-cpi

http://www.wsj.com/articles/rich-brazilians-wary-of-government-look-abroad-1423182280

http://www.as-coa.org/blogs/s%C3%A3o-paulo-2015-blog-breakdown-brazils-latest-budget-cuts

The May-June Pulse Asia Survey results report, for the first time since he declared his intention to run, Vice President Jejomar Binay not in first place among presidential contenders for the upcoming elections. This result is not entirely a surprise. Since the middle of 2014, Binay has been experiencing a steady decrease in his presidential preference rating as well as his overall approval as the public has been inundated with evidence detailing his and his family’s corruption in government and accumulation of wealth, while Binay and his plethora of spokespeople have not been able to credibly respond.

What, perhaps, is surprising is the class breakdown of Binay’s support.

Binay Presidential Preference (Pulse Asia)

Socioeconomic Class March 2015 June 2015
ABC 22 29
D 30 20
E 33 26

Between March and June, ABC classes were the only socioeconomic section where preference for Binay rose. Preference for Binay markedly dropped among D and E classes. In June, the ABC classes expressed the highest level of support for Binay while the D class expressed the lowest level of support for Binay. With a margin of error of ±3, all of these shift are statistically significant.

In recent years, “bobotantes” has been gaining traction as a pejorative term that essentially blames voters for the ills of Philippine politics. The term refers to voters who elect, and especially re-elect corrupt or poorly performing public officials, and often goes with the assumption that those who do so are poor and uneducated. Some of those who assail so-called “bobotantes” even go so far as to suggest that the Philippines would be better off if elections were determined exclusively by the middle class and that there should be formal education requirements in order to qualify to vote – something that harks to the days when property requirements and literacy tests were used to keep democracy exclusionary.

Many of the self-styled intelligista have blamed the career and popularity of VP Binay on these “bobotantes.” It seems an obvious connection. The public image Binay seeks to project is designed to pander to the poorer classes. Emphasizing his humble upbringing and his dark skin (which unfortunately and quite disgustingly continues to be associated with economic class in the Philippines) has been a central part of the Binay narrative. Meanwhile, the Binay machinery is a quintessential exemplar of clientelism. Both in Makati as well as nation-wide through the sister-cities and other programs, the Binay machine provides much-needed services and benefits. While providing services is no doubt part and parcel of what a government official should do, what makes the Binay version clientelistic is that it is predicated on a patron-client relationship or a quid-pro-quo between him and voters. If the voter does not adhere to Binay’s or his area leaders’ demands, the voter can be excluded from these services. For example: Binay touts that hospital care and senior citizen benefits are free in Makati (which is also not completely true). However, openly criticizing Binay or refusing to attend a pro-Binay rally can result in the revocation of these benefits. Those known to be critical of the Vice President may be the only ones among their neighbors to not receive calamity assistance during the constant flooding that happens during the rainy season. While healthcare and calamity assistance are certainly forms of services, these Makati programs are designed to allow the Mayor to control the population by selectively excluding people from what should be public benefits. Instead of truly universal healthcare that would allow any number of forms of proof that one is a Makati resident, residents must apply for yellow cards with the Binay logo that require, among other documents, barangay clearance. The overwhelming majority of barangay captains are, of course, part of the Binay machinery. Instead of fixing drainage and floodways, the city reserves money for household-level calamity assistance bags, complete with the Binay logo. In this way, Binay uses what should be public funds and programs as a method of instilling personal loyalty and control. Residents always live under the threat that their benefits may be taken away.

Those who have blamed Binay’s heretofore survey performance on “bobotantes” presumably believe that Binay’s image as a “poor dark-skinned orphan” resonantes with poorer and less educated voters and that poorer households, because of their greater need for services, are more vulnerable to clientelistic control. They believe that poorer voters do not care about Binay’s corruption as long as they receive clientelistic benefits. On the other hand, middle and upper class voters are value-voters better able to judge politicians without being tainted by clientelism. This latest Pulse Asia survey, however, suggests that these assumptions are wrong.

Binay’s support among the ABC classes has been statistically consistent since September of 2014 until this most recent survey when it shot up by 7 points. The prior consistency could perhaps be explained by the theory that most middle and upper class voters had already firmly made up their minds about Binay or were already aware of his corruption, and so were not swayed by revelations over the last ten months. However, I am at a loss when trying to think of explanations for this latest spurt among upper and middle class support. I am not aware of any of Binay’s efforts to appeal to the middle and upper classes (besides promises of positions and public works contracts, but which I would imagine are limited to a population too small to have an impact on this survey) and there has been no change in his narrative to make him more appealing to upper and middle classes.

On the other hand, Binay’s main response to the flood of evidence linking him to corruption has been to ramp up local organizing and campaigning, which include media events that pander to his “I came from poverty and am down to earth” image (i.e. boodle fights), the increased distribution of goods, and loyalty checks among local organizers. These all indicate intensified appeals to the D and E classes, including intensified clientelism. By blatantly skirting the ever-growing issues of corruption and believing that entertainment and dole-outs would be adequate distractions to the issues, Binay, like those who use “bobotantes,” assumes that poorer voters are stupid, value-less, and easily bought. However, Binay’s steady decline among both the D and E classes illustrates how erroneous it is to assume that poorer voters are so easily manipulated.

There is no single panacea to the ills of Philippine politics. Meaningful reform and transformation will require the combination of many efforts and solutions. Excluding those assumed to be “bobotantes” from the democratic process is not one of these solutions. Exposing and opposing boboliticos is.

I was really nerd happy when I woke up this morning thinking I would spend the day poking around the newly-launched data.gov.ph. In fairness, I appreciate the effort to put all government data in one place (which should be the mandate of NSCB, but anyway), and to have it available in CSV, XML, or ASCII – basically anything that’s not PDF – is an upgrade.

However, upon further perusal I remain frustrated and disappointed. It’s clear that beyond the two points I mentioned above there has been no attempt to make the data usable. In order to avoid being called one of those “cottage industries” who makes a living off of criticizing the administration no matter how good its intentions are, I offer some obvious problems and some simple solutions:

1) The search function is not functioning.

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Say that I want to know the maternal mortality over time. I go to data, search for “maternal mortality.” No results. I search for “maternal,” no results. “Mortality,” “death” and “deaths,” still no dice. (At this point I’m wondering “Shouldn’t there be regular data on how many people die every month, the cause of death, and disaggregated to at least the provincial level?” But I don’t want to get side-tracked). Finally I search for women, and lo-and-behold, there is one lonely result: Health and Nutrition: % of Women who Died Due to Pregnancy-Related Causes. Jackpot

However, this discovery begs other questions. Why is there only one result when you search for women? Does this mean there is no data on women in the workforce, women married and at what age, average income of women-headed households, women who hold public office, or the percentage of LGUs that use their Gender and Development Budgets? (A search, by the way of “female” or “gender” doesn’t yield these results either.)

I know government data on these topics exists. I’ve seen it. But it is buried in spreadsheets that cover multiple topics and are named something so general so as to obscure like “Updates 2012.” This problem of “the data is publicly available but no one knows where” is the the exact problem this whole Open Data initiative is trying to address.

Solution: Tagging. The whole point of having a search function is so that you type an intuitive, not technical, description of what you’re looking for and then you find it. However, this only works if the name of the file or its tags have intuitive descriptors. Let’s look at the tags for Health and Nutrition: % of Women who Died Due to Pregnancy-Related Causes.

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“Health” and “Nutrition” are already part of the title, so they are unnecessary but don’t hurt. “Philippines,” well yes, we are in the Philippines, all of this is assumed to be data about the Philippines, so again, totally unnecessary but doesn’t take away anything. “NAMRIA” stands for the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority. I had to Google that because I had no idea what it was and I have no idea why anyone who wanted to know about maternal mortality would search for NAMRIA.

Common sense should be used when making tags. What is this dataset? Luckily, its title is clear and specific. What are some other terms people would use to describe this and related topics? Well, “maternal mortality,” “mothers,” “death,” “female,” and “reproductive health” for starters. Tags and search terms must be assigned from the point of view of potential users.

2) Non-uniformity in data. Data is a wonderful thing. Having lots of data means that you can not only know about a single phenomenon, but you can know how it relates to other phenomena and come up with an idea about what causes it.

Say that I want to know the relationship between maternal mortality and public expenditures in health. This seems like a reasonable thing to want to know and something that we probably should know if we are going to make good policy. Maternal mortality data looks like this:

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The data is obviously incomplete, which is a whole other issue. I will say, though, that having data that is accurate to the local level, even if you only have it in a few areas, is more useful for designing government interventions than having macro data that reflects the average in the country overall but does not tell you about the situation of any particular community. But I digress.

With this data it should be possible to look at the relationship between public health expenditure at the local level and maternal mortality. However, all the budget tables are just that, tables. This map must have been generated from a table, so that table already exists, but where is that table?? I need it to make simple comparison with health expenditure, not to mention more complicated statistical techniques that could reveal the effect of health expenditure on maternal mortality holding constant things like average income, average children per household, rural or urban character, etc.

Solution: The numbers exist. Show us the numbers.

(By the way, searches for “health expenditures” only resulted in national budgets. Searches for “local government units” and “IRA” turned up null.)

3) Labeling. In order to demonstrate that math has practical implications in life, 3rd grade math was full of word problems. My 3rd grade teacher insisted that we label all our answers. “The answer is not 5, it’s 5 apples. Why can’t you just say 5? Because I’m a mathematician, not a psychic, and you can’t assume I know what you’re talking about.”

Again, let’s go back to Health and Nutrition: % of Women who Died Due to Pregnancy-Related Causes. It seems pretty straight-forward: the percentage of women who died due to pregnancy-related causes in the colored local government units. However, Died when? In the past month? In 2013? Ever?? You can’t accurately find out important relationships (like those mentioned in #2) if you don’t specify a time period. Also, are these all women or women of child-bearing age? Also another potential source of skewed data.

Another example, here is a section of a file called “31 October 2012 NEDA Updates” available at  http://data.gov.ph/catalogue/dataset/31-october-2012-updates

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This data sheet begets more questions than answers. What does “% g.r.” mean? There is no key that explains this in the file. If the purpose of making data open is so that any citizen, whether they are a technical expert or not, can access it and understand it, then things that are not immediately understandable to the layman should have an explanatory note in the key.

Beyond that however, there are items that are simply impossible to understand even if you do have prior knowledge. For example: row 25, the number of building permits for quarter 2 of 2012 = 4.4. It would seem that this represents the absolute number of building permits. (I can’t see how building permits could be a percentage of anything, unless you meant the value of building permits, but that’s not what it says.) So the question is 4.4 what? 4.4 thousand? 4.4 million? Similarly, the value of construction for quarter 2 of 2012 = 15.4. Again, 15.4 million pesos? 15.4 billion pesos? Or 15.4% of total GDP? Of total GNI? Or of whatever % g.r. is?

Now please look at rows 18-24, electrical consumption. Residential consumption in August 2012 (row 20) is -3.3. I find it hard to believe that residential households generated 3.3% more electricity than they consumed (thus yielding a negative value), so this makes me think -3.3 represents a change of some sort. But a change of what? Is that the change in October 2012 compared to August 2012? Of residential consumers’ share of all electricity consumed?

Again, maybe these are industry conventions that are simply going above my head, but there is no point to providing open access to data if the meaning of the data is not transparent. Accessible necessarily means understandable. Any provider of information has the duty to clearly explain what that information means, not berate the population for not understanding bureaucratic conventions.

Solution: All of these datasets already have a codebook that clearly explains the meaning of each data point and how it is derived. I am confident these codebooks must already exist because at some point NEDA, DBM, DOF, etc. have to train new staff. Just upload the codebooks and link them to the datasets.

In conclusion, Open Data could be the start of something immensely useful, but let’s not pat ourselves on the back just yet. For the Open Data project to cause real changes in its intended areas of transparency and governance, for accessibility to be real and not just a technical concept, it is not enough to just upload all the data to a central location and hope someone will have the time, energy, and expertise to do something with it. You must think of the user, the possible practical implications, and format your data accordingly. (As well as in the future, collect your data accordingly.) There are lots of other problems that make this data unusable or prohibitively difficult to use in its current form: in many files the data is laid out like text tables instead of rectangular data sets; instead of having all the data on a particular topic in one sheet (say, amount spent on public education), every year has its own file thus requiring a whole lot of manipulation before you can do any time-series analysis; the timing of the way data is displayed is inconsistent, making cross-source comparisons very difficult (e.g. some data is displayed by year, some by quarter, some by month, some by calendar year and some by fiscal year – all in the same table).

I understand that the project just started and there is a lot more that has to, and, presumably, will be done. But I do not buy the inevitable excuse of “we’re short on manpower.” The very professional and beautiful PR material that populates the site is evidence that there are very capable people working on this project. But, it seems a lot more energy and resources were put into the PR aspect than the actual data. For example, it’s clear that formatting pretty javascript price monitoring tables (you can’t call it an infographic if you cannot right-click, save, and share it) out of, say, already existing but less pretty price monitoring tables, was higher priority than conceptualizing and executing how to make basic data user-friendly. At this point the site is all shebang and no substance.

While a lot more has to be done to format the raw data, I tried to identify three quick and easy ways in which the usability of this site and its data can be greatly improved: better tagging, revealing the numbers, and labeling data (basically uploading codebooks). These are all steps that don’t need technical experts or statisticians, they just need a little common sense.

P.S. It’s possible that everything I just said is in the Action Plan for Open Data Philippines, but I have no idea because the link is broken.

Image

Womp womp.

This is going to be controversial, but I’m really happy Pnoy is abolishing the PDAF. I think it was a step in the right direction. I think there is a fundamental difference between completely discretionary, pre-budgeted projects with only after-the-fact and much later oversight, and projects that have to go through the budgetary process up front. Of course earmarks are still pork. Of course, the process of allocating those earmarks will still be a game among thieves who won’t take long to figure out how to work the system – in fact it seems to me that the reform proposal is basically an expanded CIA system. Nevertheless, I still think it’s better than PDAF. But it is definitely not the endgame.

Another more important (especially if we are talking about endgame) reason why I am happy that Pnoy announced he’s abolishing the PDAF is because it shows this administration is susceptible to popular outrage. I say the following without judgement on whether Pnoy made this move out of a good faith change of heart or not: Friday’s announcement was obviously an attempt at accommodation in light of the acute pressure the administration has been receiving from its allies and enemies alike, respected leaders and public intellectuals, as well as multitudes of the unorganized and apolitical getting ready for the much-hyped Aug. 26 anti-pork rally. Generally the goal of accommodation is to diffuse challengers. If the challengers are smart, however, they will see attempts at accommodation/diffusion as a sign of the government’s vulnerability. It should, therefore, serve as inspiration to challengers that the people can force concessions. We made the government cave on PDAF. We can make them cave on more meaningful reforms. See you Monday morning.

District Reps. that voted for 1109 that won with less than 50% of votes

Name Percentage Votes Won Total Votes Cast Province Party
CAJAYON, MARY MITZI LIM

27.96%

33575

120099

Kalookan LP
AGYAO, MANUEL SWEGEN

29.05%

23890

82241

Kalinga KAMPI
ARENAS, MA. RACHEL JIMENEZ

30.11%

62046

206049

Pangasinan Lakas-CMD
UY, ROLANDO ADLAO

30.75%

17,513

56,962

Cagayan de Oro City Independent
SOLIS, JOSE GUYALA

31.90%

34,860

109,262

Sorsogon KAMPI
GARAY, FLORENCIO CUATON

32.93%

29,219

88,730

Surigao del Sur Uno
LUNA, CECILIA SEARES

34.87%

34103

97808

Abra LP
ARAGO, MARIA EVITA RODA

35.87%

60,449

168,528

Laguna LP
AQUINO, JOSE II SABIJON

36.28%

43,215

119,126

Agusan del Norte Lakas-CMD
DUEÑAS, HENRY JR. MONTES

36.65%

28564

77935

Taguig KDT
BELMONTE, VICENTE JR. FLORENDO

37.14%

60,054

161,706

Lanao del Norte UNO
PIÑOL, BERNARDO JR. FANTIN

37.41%

62,973

168,315

Cotabato (North) Lakas-CMD
GO, ARNULFO FEGARIDO

37.63%

30757

81726

Sultan Kudarat KAMPI
JIKIRI, YUSOP HUSSIN

38.04%

38,839

102,102

Sulu Lakas-CMD
BAGATSING, AMADO SEVILLA

38.77%

42138

108685

Manila KAMPI
PANCRUDO, CANDIDO JR. PIOS

38.96%

39,136

100,461

Bukidnon Lakas-CMD
SANDOVAL, ALVIN SOTECO

40.19%

71490

177867

Malabon LP
BICHARA, AL FRANCIS DEL CASTILLO

40.46%

62,370

154,141

Albay NP
SUSANO, MARY ANN LABORERO

40.85%

119089

291502

QC Lakas-CMD
ANGPING, MARIA ZENAIDA

41.99%

33427

79,603

Manila NPC
SALVACION, ANDRES JR. DALDE

42.22%

29,720

70,399

Leyte PDSP
UNGAB, ISIDRO TOM

43.14%

49,264

114,195

Davao City PDP-Laban
DUMPIT, THOMAS JR. DE LARA

44.81%

69022

154021

La Union KAMPI
ROMULO, ROMAN TECSON

45.02%

97204

215900

Pasig KAMPI
ABANTE, BIENVENIDO JR. MIRANDO

45.31%

40371

89102

Manila Lakas-CMD
GONZALES, AURELIO JR. DUEÑAS

45.45%

84797

186564

Pampanga KAMPI
MENDOZA, MARK LLANDRO LATORRE

45.73%

97218

212592

Batangas NPC
SY-ALVARADO, MA. VICTORIA REYES

46.05%

98664

214268

Bulacan Lakas-CMD
RUIZ, NERISSA CORAZON SOON

46.16%

116,115

251,525

Cebu KAMPI
EMANO, YEVGENY VINCENTE BEJA

48.32%

77,076

159,519

Misamis Oriental Lakas-CMD
SAN LUIS, EDGAR SULIT

48.46%

96038

198184

Laguna Independent
NICOLAS, REYLINA GESTUVO

48.94%

88121

180047

Bulacan Lakas-CMD
ENVERGA, WILFRIDO MARK

49.41%

74921

151635

Quezon KAMPI
ABLAN, ROQUE JR. RAVELO

49.90%

58292

116820

Ilocos Norte Lakas-CMD
SALIMBANGON, BENHUR LAGO

49.90%

67,277

134,813

Cebu KAMPI

District Reps. that voted for 1109 with smallest margins of victory in 2007 – Bottom 30

Name Votes won Votes won by #2 Difference Province Party
SALIMBANGON, BENHUR LAGO

67,277

67,173

104

Cebu KAMPI
PANCRUDO, CANDIDO JR. PIOS

39,136

38,935

201

Bukidnon Lakas-CMD
LUNA, CECILIA SEARES

34103

33493

610

Abra LP
ARENAS, MA. RACHEL JIMENEZ

62046

61429

617

Pangasinan Lakas-CMD
GARAY, FLORENCIO CUATON

29,219

28,547

672

Surigao del Sur Uno
BRAVO, NARCISO JR. RECIO

27,726

26,917

809

Masbate KAMPI
MAMBA, MANUEL NOVENO

71413

70549

864

Cagayan LP
UY, ROLANDO ADLAO

17,513

16,555

958

Cagayan de Oro City Independent
DIASNES, CARLO OLIVER DONA

4430

3454

976

Batanes KAMPI
SANDOVAL, ALVIN SOTECO

71490

70331

1159

Malabon LP
DUEÑAS, HENRY JR. MONTES

28564

27107

1457

Taguig KDT
SALVACION, ANDRES JR. DALDE

29,720

28,244

1476

Leyte PDSP
AGYAO, MANUEL SWEGEN

23890

22408

1482

Kalinga KAMPI
MERCADO, ROGER GAVIOLA

82,583

80,956

1627

Southern Leyte KAMPI
ABLAN, ROQUE JR. RAVELO

58292

56072

2220

Ilocos Norte Lakas-CMD
SOLIS, JOSE GUYALA

34,860

31,840

3020

Sorsogon KAMPI
BARZAGA, ELPIDIO JR. FRANI

188009

184626

3383

Cavite KAMPI
RUIZ, NERISSA CORAZON SOON

116,115

112,475

3640

Cebu KAMPI
CAJAYON, MARY MITZI LIM

33575

29773

3802

Kalookan LP
AQUINO, JOSE II SABIJON

43,215

39,403

3812

Agusan del Norte Lakas-CMD
TUPAS, NIEL JR. CAUSING

66,437

62,368

4069

Iloilo LP
ABANTE, BIENVENIDO JR. MIRANDO

40371

35089

5282

Manila Lakas-CMD
CHONG, GLENN ANG

36,097

30,356

5741

Biliran LP
ROBES, ARTURO BARDILLON

55278

49485

5793

San Jose del Monte City KAMPI
NAVA, JOAQUIN CARLOS RAHMAN ARANO

37,285

31,223

6062

Guimaras KAMPI
BAGATSING, AMADO SEVILLA

42138

36023

6115

Manila KAMPI
GATCHALIAN, REXLON TING

36251

29944

6307

Valenzuela NPC
MENDOZA, MARK LLANDRO LATORRE

97218

90184

7034

Batangas NPC
ROMARATE, GUILLERMO JR. ABITONA

68,534

61,431

7103

Surigao del Norte KAMPI/Padajon Surigao
COQUILLA, TEODULO MONTANCES

86,232

78,956

7276

Eastern Samar PMP

District Reps. that voted for 1109 with smallest margins of victory in 2007 – Bottom 30

Name Votes won Votes won by #2 Difference Province Party
SALIMBANGON, BENHUR LAGO

67,277

67,173

104

Cebu KAMPI
PANCRUDO, CANDIDO JR. PIOS

39,136

38,935

201

Bukidnon Lakas-CMD
LUNA, CECILIA SEARES

34103

33493

610

Abra LP
ARENAS, MA. RACHEL JIMENEZ

62046

61429

617

Pangasinan Lakas-CMD
GARAY, FLORENCIO CUATON

29,219

28,547

672

Surigao del Sur Uno
BRAVO, NARCISO JR. RECIO

27,726

26,917

809

Masbate KAMPI
MAMBA, MANUEL NOVENO

71413

70549

864

Cagayan LP
UY, ROLANDO ADLAO

17,513

16,555

958

Cagayan de Oro City Independent
DIASNES, CARLO OLIVER DONA

4430

3454

976

Batanes KAMPI
SANDOVAL, ALVIN SOTECO

71490

70331

1159

Malabon LP
DUEÑAS, HENRY JR. MONTES

28564

27107

1457

Taguig KDT
SALVACION, ANDRES JR. DALDE

29,720

28,244

1476

Leyte PDSP
AGYAO, MANUEL SWEGEN

23890

22408

1482

Kalinga KAMPI
MERCADO, ROGER GAVIOLA

82,583

80,956

1627

Southern Leyte KAMPI
ABLAN, ROQUE JR. RAVELO

58292

56072

2220

Ilocos Norte Lakas-CMD
SOLIS, JOSE GUYALA

34,860

31,840

3020

Sorsogon KAMPI
BARZAGA, ELPIDIO JR. FRANI

188009

184626

3383

Cavite KAMPI
RUIZ, NERISSA CORAZON SOON

116,115

112,475

3640

Cebu KAMPI
CAJAYON, MARY MITZI LIM

33575

29773

3802

Kalookan LP
AQUINO, JOSE II SABIJON

43,215

39,403

3812

Agusan del Norte Lakas-CMD
TUPAS, NIEL JR. CAUSING

66,437

62,368

4069

Iloilo LP
ABANTE, BIENVENIDO JR. MIRANDO

40371

35089

5282

Manila Lakas-CMD
CHONG, GLENN ANG

36,097

30,356

5741

Biliran LP
ROBES, ARTURO BARDILLON

55278

49485

5793

San Jose del Monte City KAMPI
NAVA, JOAQUIN CARLOS RAHMAN ARANO

37,285

31,223

6062

Guimaras KAMPI
BAGATSING, AMADO SEVILLA

42138

36023

6115

Manila KAMPI
GATCHALIAN, REXLON TING

36251

29944

6307

Valenzuela NPC
MENDOZA, MARK LLANDRO LATORRE

97218

90184

7034

Batangas NPC
ROMARATE, GUILLERMO JR. ABITONA

68,534

61,431

7103

Surigao del Norte KAMPI/Padajon Surigao
COQUILLA, TEODULO MONTANCES

86,232

78,956

7276

Eastern Samar PMP